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Education is widely recognised as an imperative catalyst for the pursuit of human 
development. Yet, many young girls in the poorest regions of the world continue to 
be deprived of schooling opportunities. By and large, economic analyses show that 
low levels of education not only depress women’s social status and quality of life, but 
also limit productivity and hinder economic efficiency and growth. As such, closing 
the gender gap in schooling should be an important consideration for policy. 
 
In this paper, we seek to explain why parents choose to endow their sons with more 
education than their daughters. Specifically, our theoretical approach highlights the 
importance of incentives due to economic differentials by gender. We argue that 
when parents make rational schooling decisions for their children, they allocate their 
resources up to the point where the net marginal returns from both sons and 
daughters are equal.  
 
In particular, when the interplay of differentials in (i) the marginal loss of time due to 
schooling, (ii) the marginal return on future wage income, and (iii) the transfer rate of 
old-age support work in favour of sons, we hypothesise that daughters will end up 
receiving less education.  
 
To test our hypothesis, we use a random household sample from the six major hill 
tribes of Thailand. These hill tribes were chosen because they possess the attributes of 
a fast growing economy while retaining androcentric societal values. Empirically, we 
estimate the probability of a household practising pro-boy bias as a function of the 
three key economic differentials, controlling for household and village heterogeneity. 
 v
We compare the regression results from the linear probability model, the probit and 
logit specifications, and find them to be entirely consistent with our theory.  
 
We also find that (i) measures of wealth are independent of gender discrimination as 
long as schooling is free, and (ii) households prefer to conform to community 
preferences because they value the views of other households within their social 
group. Owing to data limitations, we leave two questions unanswered. One of them is 
the effect of changes in school fees on discriminatory behaviour; the other is how 
gender specific duties determine the state of discrimination.  
 
Overall, our results underline the potential role of economic policy in closing the 
gender gap in schooling through eliminating economic differentials across sons and 
daughters. In a hill tribe context, policy makers should understand that tribal parents 
respond to economic incentives despite subscribing to androcentric societal values, 
and decisions are influenced by community preferences, but not financial well being 





1  Introduction 
Education is widely recognised as an imperative catalyst for the pursuit of human 
development. Yet, many young girls in the poorest regions of the world continue to 
be deprived of schooling opportunities. According to the Asian Development Bank 
(1998), the school enrollment rates of boys far exceed those of girls in virtually all 
parts of the developing world, especially in the rural areas of Africa and Asia. By and 
large, economic analyses show that low levels of education not only depress women’s 
social status and quality of life, but also limit productivity and hinder economic 
efficiency and growth (Zhang et al., 1999; Schultz, 2002). Therefore, to the extent that 
efficiency and equity objectives are key development objectives, closing the gender 
gap in schooling should be an important consideration for policy. 
 
In this thesis, we seek to explain why parents choose to endow their sons with more 
education than their daughters. Specifically, our theoretical approach highlights the 
importance of incentives due to economic differentials by gender. We argue that 
when parents make rational schooling decisions for their children, they allocate their 
resources up to the point where the net marginal returns from both sons and 
daughters are equal.  
 
We propose three such economic returns and costs. Firstly, time spent in school could 
have been spent working and is therefore translated into an economic loss in 
household income. This is defined as the loss of time due to schooling. Given that 
employment opportunities for children are restricted to farming and performing 
household chores, and sons are compelled to engage in farm work while daughters 
typically perform household chores, the economic costs differentials by gender are 
not possible to determine a priori.  
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Secondly, by giving children a proper education, parents derive a tangible economic 
return in the form of future expected wages. This is called the return on future wage 
income. Since rural wages are independent of educational attainment, and urban 
wages are often higher for sons than for daughters (even at the margin), it may be 
more profitable to send sons to school, other things being equal. 
 
Thirdly, parents expect old-age support from their children, and therefore regard 
future income transfers as economic returns from education. We define this to be the 
transfer rate of old-age support. Typically, as aged parents depend on their sons more 
than daughters, the returns from educating sons may be higher. 
 
When the interplay of differentials in (i) the marginal loss of time due to schooling, (ii) 
the marginal return on future wage income, and (iii) the transfer rate of old-age 
support work in favour of sons, we hypothesise that daughters will end up receiving 
less education.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we use a random household sample from the six major hill 
tribes of Thailand, namely the Karen, the Hmong, the Lahu, the Yao, the Akha and the 
Lisu. Empirically, we estimate the probability of a household practising pro-boy bias 
as a function of the three key economic differentials, controlling for household and 
village heterogeneity. Comparing the regression results from the linear probability 
model, the probit and logit specifications, we find that they are entirely consistent 
with our theory.  
 
In addition, we find several other interesting results. Firstly, gender discrimination is 
independent of measures of wealth, both theoretically and empirically. This is true 
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only because schooling is essentially free. Secondly, households act as if they prefer to 
conform to community preferences, because they value the views of other households 
within their social group. In fact, sociability seems to amplify conformity, suggesting 
that information sharing is largely driving conformity. Again, we have empirical 
evidence to back this result. Thirdly, we believe that changes in school fees and 
gender specific tasks have significant effects on discriminatory behaviour, but we 
cannot confirm these results owing to data limitations. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter provides a brief 
review of related research. Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical model as an instrument 
for interpreting the results. Chapter 4 describes the study area and the data, putting 
together the descriptive statistics for a preliminary analysis. Chapter 5 explains the 
empirical methodology and presents the regression results. Chapter 6 addresses some 
further findings. Chapter 7 concludes. Definitions, tables and other related 























2  Related Research 
While observable outcomes of gender discrimination (skewed sex ratios at birth, 
gender wage gaps, health and education expenditure differentials, among others) are 
apparent, understanding how they come about is not as straightforward. Here, as 
elsewhere, the economist is concerned with the association of cause and outcome, and 
is keen on opening the black box of gender discrimination beyond cultural 
determinants1. In this respect, we are no different. 
 
2.1 Theories of Discrimination 
The first economic theories of discrimination, though not specifically targeted to 
explain gender disparities, serve as useful benchmarks in the literature. Here, we 
discuss two leading theories of discrimination. 
 
The first theory was developed to explain taste-based discrimination, where certain 
economic agents are prejudiced against a particular class of people, and are willing to 
pay a financial cost to avoid interacting with them (Becker, 1957). In measuring this 
cost, the concept of the “discrimination coefficient” was introduced to explain the 
phenomenon of discrimination. It proved particularly useful in explaining the 
existence of racial discrimination in the labour markets, where Negroes were 
receiving significantly lower wages than Whites. One drawback, however, was the 
theory’s inability to explain the causality of discriminatory tastes.   
 
The second theory was based on the phenomenon of statistical discrimination where 
due to incomplete information, one group of people practices discrimination against 
                                                 
1 Several authors have attributed discrimination to a single cultural reason (Arnold and Liu, 
1986; Zeng et al, 1993; Oomman and Ganatra, 2002). In our opinion, this conclusion is neither 
complete nor satisfactory. 
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another because of mistaken beliefs about their capabilities. While this theory 
portrayed uncertainty in the labour market, it implied that agents were making 
systematic errors, and thus failed to be an adequate explanation in the long run. To 
get around the problem, Phelps (1972) explained that discrimination can be a rational 
response on the employer’s part if minority groups send nosier signals.  There were 
also other works which proved that if some employee characteristics are endogenous, 
the employer’s prior beliefs can be self-fulfilling, and statistical discrimination can be 
an equilibrium outcome (Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain, 1977; Lundberg and Startz, 
1983; Coate and Loury, 1993). 
 
In principle, the model in this thesis follows the idea of taste-based discrimination.  
Unlike Becker, however, we will go further by specifying the agent’s preferences, in 
order to explain the causes of discrimination. In addition, since our decision-making 
agents are assumed to be perfectly informed, ours is clearly not a case of statistical 
discrimination. 
 
2.2 Modelling Economic Differentials 
By means of conventional economic wisdom, several authors have modelled 
households as rational economic agents, who allocate their resources rationally by 
weighing the marginal costs of those allocations against their marginal returns.  
 
One of the earliest conceptions of this kind was presented in Becker and Tomes 
(1976), who worked with a model whereby parents decide how to allocate resources to 
children with different endowments. They showed that, given different endowments 
across children, parents could either compensate those with poorer endowments by 
spending more on them, or reinforce those with better endowments. They concluded 
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that parents tend to invest more human capital in better endowed children, and more 
non-human capital in poorer ones. This notion was further elaborated in Behrman, 
Pollak and Taubman (1986), who worked with the “earnings-bequest model”, 
whereby parents are not only concerned with the distribution of wealth, but also the 
distribution of lifetime earnings among their children, and thus choose the optimal 
amount of bequest to allocate to each of their children.  
 
More recently, Davies and Zhang (1995) furthered the discussion by exploring the 
impact of pure sex preference and differential earnings opportunities (by gender)2. 
They concluded that boys are bestowed with greater levels of investment, provided 
that they own better earnings opportunities and parents do not face binding 
constraints in allocating bequests. 
 
Though similar in a methodological sense, our model differs from all the above in two 
aspects. Firstly, we choose to model non-altruistic parents, who do not allocate 
bequests to their children, and whose only returns from investment are the realised 
portion of their children’s future wages for the purpose of old age support. Secondly, 
we do not think of children as being “different” because of their endowments, but 







                                                 
2 Notably, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) looked into the relationship between differentials in 
the wage returns to education, to child survival and mortality rates. Other authors (Zhang, 
Zhang and Li, 1999; Esteve-Volart, 2000) discussed the implications of such differentials for 
macroeconomic growth. 
3 These differences in expected future earnings manifest in two ways – job types and wage 
levels.  
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3  The Model 
We consider tribal people as economic agents who make rational investment 
decisions about education. In a tribal household, parents will make these decisions on 
behalf of their children and respond sensibly to economic incentives. In particular, 
they recognise the existence of differentials by gender in the costs of time due to 
schooling, future wage income, as well as old–age support transfer rates, and take 
these differentials into account when making schooling decisions. In equilibrium, 
therefore, whether or not sons receive more education than daughters depends 
critically on the interplay of those differentials. The model will be able to ascertain 
whether tribal parents discriminate against any sex, given a particular set of 
differentials, and prove that certain conditions are sufficient for discrimination 
against girls.   
 
3.1 The Tribal Household’s Problem 
Given that our focus is to analyse the effect of economic incentives on schooling 
decisions, we choose to treat parents – husband and wife – as a single, representative 
unit. Particularly, we assume that they make decisions jointly, without disagreements 
due to asymmetry in preferences, and the complication of household bargaining 
between husband and wife does not arise4. This assumption is reasonable because 
tribal parents have little individual endowments of wealth and education (prior to 
marriage), which are strong proxies for bargaining power in decision making 
(Schultz, 1999). 
                                                 
4 The concept of Nash bargaining between husband and wife, reflecting asymmetric 
preferences and power, has been widely discussed by McElroy and Horney (1981), Thomas 
(1990, 1994), Pollak (1994), Schultz (1999) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999).  
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We also make the assumption that parents are jointly rational and non-altruistic, that 
is, they only care about (i) their own (direct) payoffs, and (ii) whichever part of their 
child’s payoffs that (indirectly) enter their own.  
 
At the heart of the model lies the choice variable, investment in education (or the 
amount of time spent in school) . In fact, we liken the level of investment to 
educational attainment, and will use them interchangeably, assuming that 
investments in education will necessarily (and proportionately) bring about its 
attainment
th
5. We ignore any possibility of quality differentials across schools that may 
affect the returns from schooling6. We also assume that there is only one pair of 
representative children, son and daughter7, and we distinguish between the son’s 
education  and the daughter’s ith jth . 
 
With perfect information of the present and forecasts of the future, the joint 
intertemporal utility of a typical household is: 
 
1 1( , ) ρ+ += +t t t tU u u u u  
(1) 
                                                 
5 In other words, we claim that parents choose their children’s education level, making an 
implicit assumption that there are no dropouts throughout the course - regular attendance is a 
sufficient condition for completion. We verified that this fact from our interviews with the 
village heads. 
6 Even though some schools may provide education of higher quality (Bedi and Edwards, 
2002), there is no evidence to suggest that either sex suffers directly from lower quality, as 
most children go through coeducation. Also, we disregard any possibility that the curriculum 
may be male-centered, giving boys the relative advantage (Leach, 2000). Therefore, quality-
differentials, if any, will have no bearing on our gender analysis. 
7 As long as gender-specific characteristics are homogeneous, our analysis can be extended to 
larger families without loss of generality.  
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where  and  are the parents’ joint utility in the present and future periods 
respectively, and 
tu 1+tu
ρ  is the discount factor between the two periods. From the parents’ 
perspective, the future refers to the period when their children provide them with 
“old-age support” via the transfer of a share of their income. It is straightforward to 
think of (0,1)ρ ∈ . 
 
We further decompose the present period utility into three components, namely 
household income , the value of household work 
tu
ty tx and the variable costs of 
education . For simplicity, all components enter the utility linearly with equal 
weights: 
tv
( , , ) = + −t t t t t t tu y x v y x v  
(2) 
Tribal household income (consisting of farm output alone8) can be thought of as the 
market value of farm output, regardless of whether it is actually sold, bartered for 
other goods, or self-consumed. Given that farming requires a fair amount of brute 
strength, sons are compelled to engage (voluntarily or involuntarily) in farm work. 
Logically, any time committed to schooling will induce a corresponding loss in 
household income. Hence, household income should somewhat be decreasing and 
concave in the son’s education: 
2
20,  0








                                                 
8 Since tribal households are primarily farmers, and farm output constitutes a major part of 
income, we shall ignore any non-labour income.  
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In fact, to make our analysis more transparent, we propose a specific form below: 
 
2








Even though equation (4) does not explicitly state the functional form of income, they 
impose strict concavity of income in education. In fact, the first-order equation in (4) 
can be thought of as the marginal loss in income due to schooling, and the second-
order condition ensures that it is always increasing9. Moreover, we term α  the 
coefficient of marginal loss in income.  
 
On the other hand, daughters hardly (if, at all) contribute in farming. Hence, we 









Like any other household, tribal ones have a fair share of household work to 
complete. As women typically perform such chores, it is sensible to think of 
daughters, not sons, as having to provide the effort10. Again, time spent in schooling 
will induce a corresponding amount of household work not done. Therefore: 
 
                                                 
9 Contrary to Yang and An (2002), we think that farm earnings is convex in experience, not 
concave, because there is a steep learning curve to farming (especially for young children).  
Consequently, the marginal loss of household income will be increasing in schooling.  
10 Knodel (1997) also found that Thai women are typically responsible for household work, 
while men are not.     
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2















As in the case of equation (4), equation (6) ensures strict concavity of household work 
in education.  In addition, the first-order equation in (6) can be thought of as the 
marginal loss in household work due to schooling, and the second-order condition 
ensures that it is always increasing11. β  denotes the coefficient of marginal loss in 
household work. 
 
Notice that even though the monetary value of household work is not directly 
observable, we have implicitly assumed that it exists [equation (2)]. Since daughters 
are sometimes employed to perform menial tasks, we can use the wage rate for those 
tasks as an approximation to the value of household work. 
 
Next, we regard school fees and expenditures on stationery as the only variable costs 
of education, such that: 











11 As in the case of farm work, if household work is characterised by increasing returns due to 
effort, it is then logical to think of the marginal loss of household work to be increasing in 
schooling. 
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where iφ and jφ  are the constant marginal costs of schooling12 for sons and daughters 
respectively. Clearly, they also represent the variable costs of education. 
 
Realistically speaking, there exist other significant variable costs, especially for the 
daughter. For instance, if fewer girl-schools exist (as compared to boy-schools), then it 
must be that girls incur higher travelling and lodging expenses than boys. We resolve 
this issue by internalising all perceivable costs of time into the loss of household work 
[equation (6)].  
 
In most cases, school fees and expenditures on stationeries are non-discriminatory by 
sex13. Therefore, we shall eliminate fee differentials for the rest of this chapter by 
making the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 1 The variable costs of education are gender-neutral for all levels of education, 
such that the marginal costs of schooling are equal across sexes: 
 
i jφ φ φ= =  
 
We now move on to examine the parents’ joint utility in the future period , which 
we consider to be composed of old-age support 
1+tu
1+ts  in income transfers alone14: 
 
 
                                                 
12 Lavy (1996) argued that the price of schooling is increasing in education level, and in our 
case, we have specifically assumed that the marginal increase is constant. 
13 Since primary and secondary education are heavily subsidised, and institutes of higher 
education normally charge one fee for all, fee-differential by sex (if any) is negligible. 
14 We ignore the fact that parents may also demand co-residence and informal caregiving from 
their offsprings, in addition to income transfers (Pezzin and Schone, 1999). 
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1 1( ) 1+ + +=t t tu s s  
(9) 
It is important to reiterate that old-age support in period 1t +  is perceived at period , 
and we assume that parents form rational expectations based on perfect information 
about average wages (both rural and urban) for sons and daughters.  
t
 
From a pragmatic viewpoint, all parents regard old-age support as “gender-neutral”, 
that is, income transfers from sons and daughters are perfectly substitutable. 
Furthermore, the old-age support function comprises of only net wage income - the 
share of the children’s gross wage income that is transferred (at a constant transfer 
rate of θ ) to their parents. Thus, we present the following old-age support function: 
 
1 1 1θ θ+ + += +t i it j jts w w  
(10) 
where  and 1+itw 1+jtw  refer to the gross wage income (future period) of sons and 
daughters respectively. iθ  and jθ  denote the corresponding transfer rates.  
 
In fact, gross wage income itself can be broken down further. Since all tribal children 
have the potential to migrate to the cities to find work, their wage income then 
comprises of a rural wage component 1+tw  if they do not migrate; plus an urban wage 
premium component 1+tw  if they do, thus: 
 
1 11 + ++ = +it ititw w w  
(11) 
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1 11 + ++ = +jt jtjtw w w  
(12) 
We also make an assumption that the rural wage component is unaffected by the level 
of education, whereas the urban wage premium component is linear and increasing in 
education: 
11 0++



























It is apparent that the first-order equations in (14) and (15) represent the marginal 
returns on wage income due to education of sons and daughters respectively. The 
second-order conditions ensure that those marginal returns are constant. As a result 
of the above equations, gross wage income is deemed to be linear in education for 
both sexes15. 
 
Besides, we envisage that urban wage premiums are strictly higher for sons than for 
daughters, at any level of education:  
 
                                                 
15 Although Deolalikar (1993), Blau et al. (2001) and Schultz (2002) have argued that gross 
wage income should be concave in education, but as the education levels of tribal children are 
relatively low, we believe that their wage incomes have yet to arrive at the point of decreasing 
returns. In addition, at the village level by gender, our non-parametric specification test cannot 
reject a linear relationship between perceived urban wage income and education.  
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1 1,  + +> ∀ =it jt it jtw w h h  
(16) 
We also have in mind a critical level of education  ih , whereby sons will migrate if and 
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and likewise for the daughter: 
1
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Without loss of generality, we can ignore equations (17) to (20) for the rest of the 
analysis. This is because parents will not invest positive amounts of income in their 
                                                 
16 Since rural wage is assumed to be fixed for tribal children, higher wage incomes are clearly 
attainable only if they migrate to the cities. Here, we impose a perfectly elastic supply of rural-
urban labour, that is, anyone who attains the critical education level, is always willing and 
able to migrate, and will do so. This assumption is not unrealistic given that the majority of 
parents (i) desire their children to migrate and (ii) believe that education significantly increases 
the probability of migration. There is also evidence that educated youths in the villages 
adjacent to the city tend to migrate. We rule out cases where one attaches value to the 
intangibles of staying put (for instance, homesickness), and weighs it above the urban wage 
premium component. 
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children’s education up to h  if the rural wage component is neutral to education 
[equation (13)]. Consequently, only education levels of  are feasible at the 
optimum
* ≥h h
17. In other words, parents believe that investments in children’s education 
are riskless because all children endowed with schooling will eventually (or at least, 
as foreseen by their parents) migrate to the cities to work.  
 
3.2 Equilibrium Analysis 
Based on equations (4), (6), (14) and (15), we have an objective utility function U  that 
is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in education  and ith jth . 
Therefore, we are assured of a unique interior solution in an unconstrained 
optimisation setting18. 
 
Maximising the tribal household’s intertemporal utility, we obtain the following 












ρ θ ω φ
α






and the second-order conditions can be neatly expressed in the negative definite 
Hessian matrix19: 
                                                 
17 We call this the migration criterion. Refer to Appendix 1 for a simple proof. 
18 Our results remain valid when the household is subjected to financial constraints, as long as 
it is non-binding. 






−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦  
 
In addition, we derive an intuitive result which says that the present value of 
marginal returns less marginal losses must be equal across sexes, so that in 
equilibrium: 
* * [  ]  [  ]i i it j j jth hρ θ ω α ρ θ ω β φ− = − =  
(22) 
With the results obtained so far, we can now define an equilibrium gender 
discrimination index that will be able to capture all the determinants, and can be 
conveniently expressed. 
 
Definition 1 The discrimination index  is defined as the ratio of the optimal education of 
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 > ⇒1 pro-boy bias 
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From Definition 1, it is apparent that the household’s optimal decision is contingent 
on differentials (by sex) in several exogenous variables.  
 
A priori, we think that a pro-boy bias is most likely to exist, so for the rest of this 
chapter, we are going to derive some useful results that will reveal the sufficient 
conditions for a pro-boy bias. 
 
Proposition 1 If net marginal returns on wage income are gender-neutral, then we should 
expect a pro-boy bias in education if the coefficient of marginal loss in household work is 
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Proposition 2 If gross marginal returns on wage income are gender-neutral, then the ratio of 





     















Proposition 3 If transfer rates are gender-neutral, then the ratio of net marginal returns on 
wage income is directly related to the ratio of gross marginal returns on wage income. 
 
Proof. 
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Proposition 4 Following propositions 2 and 3, if the matrix of gross marginal returns on 
wage income and transfer rates is weakly greater (where at least one component is strictly 
greater, and the other no lesser) for sons than for daughters, then the ratio of net marginal 





    














Proposition 5 Following propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4, if the matrix of gross marginal returns on 
wage income and transfer rates is weakly greater for sons than for daughters, and the 
coefficient of marginal loss in household work is no lesser than the coefficient of marginal loss 
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With proposition 5, we have at hand a set of sufficient conditions to determine 
whether and why households discriminate against daughters in making schooling 
decisions. To ascertain the validity of our model, we will first conduct statistical 
preliminaries on the descriptive data in the next chapter, followed by regression 




4  Study Area and Data 
 
4.1 Study Area 
Our study area20 is in the northern part of Thailand, Southeast Asia. Thailand is 
among the wealthiest developing nations in the world, with a Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita of US$2,010, which is well above what the average developing 
country achieved in 200021.  
 
Despite rapid economic development across the country, the northern part of 
Thailand is still largely rural and the feature of male dominance is especially salient 
among the hill tribe people22. In them, we find strong evidence of pro-boy bias in 
several aspects of their lives, not least in the schooling decision (see Table 2), even 
though primary education is supposed to be compulsory for all children23.  
 
Combining the attributes of a fast growing economy while retaining androcentric 
societal values24, the hill tribes of Thailand make an ideal test bed for our study. 
 
4.2 Data 
We collected the data over a period of two months, targeting at the six major hill 
tribes of Thailand, namely the Karen, the Hmong, the Lahu, the Yao, the Akha and the 
Lisu. From a pool of villages which have had prior contact with the local Non-
                                                 
20 Provincial and district maps for locating our study area are attached in Appendix 5.  
21 Source: World Development Indicators 2003 Online, World Bank. The average GNP per 
capita for low and middle income countries was around US$1,200. 
22 These hill tribes originate from China, and have established themselves in Northern 
Thailand, particularly in the provinces of Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. They make up roughly 
1.6 percent of Thailand’s population, boasting an estimated 991,122 people in 1999 (McKaskill 
and Kampe, 1997; Ritchie and Bai, 1999). For details on each hill tribe, refer to Appendix 4. 
23 The National Education Act of 1999 advocates the provision of 12 years of basic education, 
but compulsory education is currently set at only six years (primary school). For a detailed 
introduction to the educational opportunities for hill tribe children, refer to Fujioka (2002).   
24 This is over and above the fact that male dominance is a deeply-rooted cultural phenomenon 
in Southeast Asia. 
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Government Organisations (NGO) in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, the sample was 
randomly chosen. The data is collected through the means of village and household 
questionnaires25, with the help of the Sustainable Alternative Development 
Association (SADA) of Chiang Mai, and the Hill Area Development Foundation 
(HADF) of Chiang Rai26.  
 
Each household was given a set of questionnaire, which we call the household 
module, and the head of every village was given another set, which we call the village 
module. Since most tribal dialects have no written form, less the Yao, all answers had 
to be translated from dialect into Thai, thereafter documented in Thai, and finally, 
translated for the second time into English. The full set of questionnaires (in both 
English and Thai) can be found in Appendix 6. 
 
Altogether, we collected data from 633 tribal households in 11 villages, across the two 
provinces. Of these, 249 households (39.3 percent) are from the Karen, 59 households 
(9.3 percent) are from the Hmong, 59 households (9.3 percent) are from the Lahu, 50 
households (7.9 percent) are from the Yao, 116 households (18.3 percent) are from the 
Akha, and 100 households (15.8 percent) are from the Lisu. 
 
4.2.1 Discrimination Index  
The key dependent variable in our study is the discrimination index, defined as the 
ratio of the optimal education level of the son to that of the daughter. Although this 
                                                 
25 Our survey resembles selected components of the World Bank’s Living Standards 
Measurement Study (LSMS).  For a thorough treatment on survey methodology of the LSMS, 
refer to Grosh and Glewwe (2003). 
26 Both SADA and HADF have been working closely with the hill tribes for at least 5 years on 
tribal development issues, and their involvement further validates the accuracy of our study. 
Notably, their suggestions on the questionnaires were highly regarded, and often 
implemented. 
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index is not empirically observable, it can be derived from educational attainment 
figures with suitable adjustments. 
 
In order to ascertain accurately the level of discrimination in each household, we will 
only work out the discrimination indices of households that have at least one pair of 
children (of different gender), both of whom are schooling or working. To satisfy this 
criterion, we have to do away with 339 households that do not have both male and 
female children, and 83 households without a pair of schooling or working children 
(of different gender). This procedure, though leaving us with only 256 candidate 
households (or 40.4 percent of the original data), will allow for a more robust 
analysis27.      
 
To work out the empirical discrimination index, we first distinguish between the 
child’s expected and actual educational attainment28. Then, if the children are still 
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If instead, the children are working, then: 
 
                                                 
27 Alternatively, if we include the rest of the 377 households in our analysis, we will have to 
estimate the true discrimination indices for more than half of these households, leaving the 
empirical results highly questionable.  
28 We assign a coding system to the Thai education system, so as to be able to compare 
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where m  and n  denote the number of sons and daughters respectively. Thereafter, 
we will categorise the households as follows: 
 > ⇒1 pro-boy bias 
= ⇒1 gender-neutral 
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which is consistent with our theoretical formulation in the previous chapter. 
 
This index29 can be interpreted easily. For example, in a household with one pair of 
schooling children, the index will be strictly greater than unity if the son goes to 
school while the daughter does not.  Similarly, if both children are working, the index 
will also be strictly greater than unity if the son possesses a higher education level 
than the daughter. Moreover, this index is capable of describing complicated 
scenarios for households with a different number of sons and daughters, and 
provides a quantitative measure of the degree of discrimination. 
 
4.2.2 Demographic Data 
The first section in Table 3 shows the demographic descriptives of the households by 
gender bias. It is apparent that parental characteristics such as age and ownership of 
                                                 
29 The interval of 0.20 is arbitrary. In principle, any discrimination index that is centered 
around one and is strictly positive for all categories will do. Furthermore, if we adopt the 
limited dependent variable model for empirical analyses, the absolute value of the index is 
irrelevant. At this stage, however, we prefer to create an arbitrary interval to illustrate village 
and tribe heterogeneity in discrimination. 
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Thai identification do not appear to be different across bias groups, while the 
education level of the husband (but not the wife) appears to be related to gender 
bias30. 
 
Also, the number of children does not appear to be correlated with gender bias, which 
makes good sense because education is virtually free. Hence, financial constraints 
(due to an increase in the number of children) cannot be binding31. In addition, 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory households are almost identically distributed 
across the two asset wealth groups, attesting to our conjecture32. 
 
Interestingly, whether male-headed or not, households appear to be equally likely to 
discriminate, perhaps illustrating the feature of mutual decision making among 
husbands and wives, as previously discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
At the village level, demographic descriptives are shown in the first section of Table 4. 
Clearly, the number of households, the village population and the land area do not 
seem to differ across bias groups. In fact, as each of these characteristics is potentially 
a proxy for wealth, we would not have expected otherwise.  
 
We expected missionaries to either influence villagers in valuing gender equity or 
have no effect on discrimination, but our Christianity dummy turns out to be 
                                                 
30 Various studies have found that better educated mothers also tend to groom healthier and 
better educated daughters (Behrman and Wolfe, 1987; Schultz, 2002), though the same cannot 
be said about our data. In addition, we could have considered parents’ occupation as a 
candidate explanatory variable, if not for the fact that (almost) all of them are primarily 
engaged in farming and related activities. 
31 This provides some evidence to support the use of unconstrained optimisation in our 
theoretical setup.  
32 Having said that, we cannot dispute results from other studies in other countries (Filmer 
and Pritchett, 1999; Maitra, 2003), where income and wealth seemed to correlate positively 
with schooling.  
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negatively related to gender bias instead. To some extent, we believe that this is 
because the Christianity dummy may also be spuriously correlated to statistical noise. 
 
4.2.3 Household Heterogeneity Data 
In the third section of Table 3, we present the household characteristics by gender 
bias. The amenities index, comprising of ownership of television sets and access to 
bottled or piped water, among others, does not seem to differ across bias groups. 
Again, as this measure would have been highly correlated to household wealth, this 
observation comes as no surprise. Similarly, the sociability index33 appears not to vary 
across bias groups, suggesting that the degree of social interaction has no bearing on 
the choice of gender bias34. 
 
We also include four dichotomous variables in this section, namely (i) past 
participation in an NGO or governmental project, (ii) believing that children have a 
better chance to migrate to urban cities given better education, (iii) ownership of the 
land that they live on, and (iv) have any form of savings. Except for land ownership, 
none of these variables appears to differ across bias groups. 
 
4.2.4 Village Heterogeneity Data 
The characteristics for all 11 villages, sorted by bias groups, are shown in the second 
section of Table 4. Among the five constructed indices, we expected the women 
power index, consisting of proxies for women’s rights and status, to exhibit a sizeable 
                                                 
33 In constructing the index, we have assigned weights, in (proportionately) increasing 
amounts, to interaction within the village, with other villages of the same tribe, and with other 
villages of a different tribe. 
34 This, however, does not discount the possibility that social interaction is a manifestation of 
information sharing, which in turn enhances conformity. We will discuss these issues in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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difference across bias groups, but it appears to be insignificant. In so far as cultural 
(other than economic) factors are possible candidates for driving discrimination, this 
result suggests that it might not be so after all. 
 
The other indices measuring democracy, amenities, inflation and hygiene, appear to 
be unrelated to gender bias, except for the inflation index, which registers a 
remarkable significance of five percent. We believe, however, that this relationship is 
merely spurious. 
 
Moving on to the five dichotomous variables, namely (i) practicing majority voting on 
common land usage, (ii) access to paved roads, (iii) use of drainage for general waste 
disposal, (iv) ownership of private or shared toilet facilities, and (v) occurrence of any 
natural disaster in the past year, only waste drainage and defecation facilities appear 
to vary across bias groups. Once again, we think these relationships are nothing more 
than statistical coincidences. 
 
Finally, the last section of Table 4 shows the schooling facility data. Here, we try to 
depict the components of the supply constraints to education. The fact that hill tribe 
children are only offered coeducation, we do not expect the number of schools, the 
number of teachers, and travelling time to vary across bias groups. The results 




                                                 
35 The p-values for village schools and teachers do not suffice for a robust conclusion, as we 
have rounded off the averages and standard errors to integers. 
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4.2.5 Gender Differential Data 
The last section of Table 3 shows the three most important explanatory variables of 
our study36. First, the wage returns ratio indicates the relative marginal wage returns 
to education for both sexes, upon successful migration to urban cities. Second, the 
income transfer rate ratio measures the relative income (for old age support) transfer 
rates for both sexes, subject to parents’ expectations. Third, the coefficient of loss ratio 
captures the relative value of time spent in schools for both sexes, which could 
otherwise be devoted to alternative income-generating activities.  
 
Our results show that all three variables are directly (and significantly) related to 
gender bias. In fact, these relationships exhibit transitivity across the three gender bias 
groups. However, as these are only partial correlations, we will need to conduct 
regression analyses to determine the robustness of our results, by controlling for 





















                                                 
36 Please refer to Appendix 2 for a detailed explanation of how we calculated these three 
variables. 
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5  Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Methodology 
To prove that our theory, we will put the statistical preliminaries through rigorous 
tests, via a series of binary response regressions. Our baseline specification is the 
linear probability model in the following form: 
 
1 1 2 2( * 1 ) ...γ γ γ> = + + + K KP D z z z z  
(23) 
where  refers to the discrimination index and  is the vector of explanatory 
variables, consisting of three important dummy variables - the wage returns ratio 
dummy, the income transfer rate ratio dummy and the coefficient of loss ratio 
dummy
*D z
37 - and selected covariates to control for household and village heterogeneity.  
 
Although the linear probability model provides a convenient approximate to the 
underlying response probabilities (or marginal effects) γ , it assumes them to be 
constant, and cannot be an exact specification unless the range of  is severely 
restricted
z
38. For that matter, we will run the probit and logit models as alternative 
specifications. 
 
                                                 
37 These first two dichotomous variables take the value one only if the respective wage returns 
ratio and the income transfer ratio are strictly greater than one. The last variable equals one 
only if the coefficient of loss ratio is no less than one. They are formulated as such to resemble 
the sufficient condition as put forth in proposition 5.  
38 For given values of the population parameters γ , there would usually be feasible values of 
such that z zγ is outside the unit interval. Consequently, the fitted probability function would 
also fall outside the unit interval. Furthermore, the linear probability model implies that the 
marginal effect of  is constant throughout the range of , which cannot be true because a 
continual increase in  will eventually drive
z z
z ( * 1 )P D z>  to be less than zero or greater than 
one. Despite these weaknesses, the linear probability model often gives good estimates of the 
marginal effects near the centre of the distribution of . z
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The probit model is derived from a latent variable model, where the error is assumed 
to be (standard) normally distributed. The probit specification we adopt is: 
 
( * 1 ) ( ) ( ) φ
−∞
> = Φ = ∫zP D z z z dz  
(24) 
where ( )φ z is the standard normal density. Similarly, if the error from the latent 
variable specification follows a standard logistic distribution, the binary response 
model becomes a logistic specification: 
 
( * 1 ) ( )
(1 )
> = Λ = +
z
z




 In both equations (24) and (25),  and  refers to the discrimination index and the 
vector of explanatory variables respectively, as in the case of equation (23). 
*D z
 
Notably, heteroscedastic consistent covariances39 will be used in order to robustly 
estimate all three binary response models as they run into issues of non-spherical 
disturbances. We interpret the empirical results in subsequent sections.  
  
5.2 Main Findings 
Table 5 reports our main findings using the baseline specification in equation (23). 
The first column estimates the binary response of discrimination (in favour of boys), 
using the covariates in Tables 3 and 4, and the second column does a similar estimate 
                                                 
39 Nevertheless, using robust covariances in place of the usual estimators means we must think 
that the binary response models are incorrectly specified. 
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by excluding those covariates that are not individually significant at 50 percent40. In 
addition, to highlight the effects of household heterogeneity, column three estimates 
the binary response model by replacing all village characteristics with 11 village 
dummy variables41. By sheer merit of goodness-of-fit (by the fitted model’s prediction 
power and adjusted R²), these three estimations are more or less comparable. 
Nonetheless, we choose to adopt column two as our benchmark because it reflects a 
reasonable trade off between heterogeneity control and noise absorption. 
 
Results from all three estimates show that discrimination is significantly driven by the 
key dummy variables – wage returns ratio, income transfer ratio and coefficient of 
loss ratio42. Indeed, the coefficients of these key variables show little variation across 
all three columns, and more importantly, their respective response probabilities 
roughly add up to one43, which suggests that if all three differentials are strictly in 
favour of boys, a pro-boy outcome will occur with certainty. Clearly, these empirical 
results are consistent with our theory. 
 
In addition, wealth continues to emerge insignificant, echoing our findings from the 
statistical preliminaries, though peculiarly, the respondent’s age and the village 
amenities and hygiene indices seem to be explaining discrimination in column two. 
Any attempt to justify village amenities and hygiene as wealth proxies is futile, as the 
former registers a positive relationship with discrimination, while the latter shows a 
                                                 
40 Our specification checks (for omitted variables) reveal that these covariates are also not 
jointly significant.  
41 This ensures that all village specific noise will be removed from the household 
heterogeneous determinants.   
42 In fact, all three dummy variables show an emphatic 0.1 percent significance. 
43 In the linear probability model, response probabilities of binary variables are merely the 
coefficients of regression, and can be interpreted as the difference in the probability of  
when those binary variables equal one and zero. 
* 1D >
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negative correlation. Since there is no theoretical justification for these relationships, 
we will regard them as spurious.  
 
To check that our conclusions are robust to specification, we also estimate the binary 
response of discrimination using probit and logit specifications (Table 6). Here, 
columns one and three represent the probit and logit estimates of our benchmark 
variables respectively, while columns two and four show similar estimates with 
village dummy variables.  
 
We find that in most cases, the signs of the coefficients are equal across all three 
models44, at least for those coefficients that are statistically significant. This provides 
some evidence that, though imprecise, the linear probability model offers good 
estimates. Having said that, by all measures of goodness-of-fit, the probit and logit 
models do much better than the linear probability model45. This is not surprising 
given that the former assumes marginal effects γ  to be diminishing in z while the 
latter assumes constant marginal effects.  
 
Again, results from Table 6 seem to suggest that wealth is unlikely to be driving 
discrimination, while some village specific factors are, mirroring findings from the 
linear probability model. More importantly, the key dummy variables continue to 
exhibit strong positive impacts on discrimination in all four columns. Like previous 
estimates from the linear probability model, the probit and logit results are consistent 
with theory. 
                                                 
44 In fact, using the rough rule of thumb, we can even compare the coefficients across all three 
models by dividing the probit estimates by 2.5 and the logit estimates by 4. We omit this 
comparison as it is not essential for our purpose. 
45 Results from Table 6 show that probit and logit estimates have high prediction powers of up 
to 95.7 percent, and adjusted R² of up to 83.8 percent. 
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6  Further Discussion 
 
6.1 Community Preferences and Conformity 
For most hill tribes, cultural and community influences are deeply rooted in every 
household, and hill tribe communities are typically closely-knit. This can be attributed 
to the fact that tribal people spend most, if not all, of their lives on the hills, and have 
few opportunities to interact with lowland people. Consequently, their social circles 
are relatively small and culturally unvaried. 
 
Under this sort of social framework, our intuition tells us that parents tend to refer to 
their social groups before choosing their children’s education levels. This is because 
there are disincentives to be different in a closely-knit community, where an 
individual dislikes subjection to social stigma. Moreover, because individuals within 
the community engage in lifelong friendships, there exist an exceptional level of trust 
and everyone else’s opinion is often sought after.  
 
In other words, other things being equal, we believe that they prefer to conform 
(through information sharing) to community preferences: 
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jth represent the average optimal education levels chosen by other 
households, and  denotes the resulting average discrimination index of the **D
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community. Equation (26) suggests that (i) parents derive maximum utility from 
complete conformity to the average community preferences46, and (ii) doing so would 
strictly increase their utility if they do not (already) conform.    
 
To test for the effect of community preferences on household decisions, we again 
estimate the binary response of discrimination, augmented with controls for 
community preferences and the interaction between community preferences and 
sociability47. From Table 7, it is clear that (i) households are more likely to 
discriminate when the average discrimination index of the village is high, and (ii) the 
phenomenon of conformity accentuates via social interaction48. Together, these results 
suggest that, through information sharing, tribal households tend to conform to 
community preferences. 
 
6.2 School Fees and Discrimination 
Throughout this thesis, we have assumed that school fees (and thus the marginal 
costs of schooling) are gender-neutral, so one’s instincts may be to conclude that 
changes in school fees should not affect the discrimination index, because any 
increase (or decrease) in fees should induce an equal number of “exits” (or “entrants”) 
from both sexes49. However, due to a change in the relative number of “exits” or 
                                                 
)46 Assuming that U  is concave in , the partial derivative will be zero at the optimum.   **(D D−
47 Our proxy for community preferences is the average discrimination index of each village. By 
virtue of sociability indices, we group households into “sociable” (greater than the mode 
sociability index) and “less sociable” (less than the mode sociability index) to create a dummy 
variable for sociability.  
48 Here, we ought to distinguish between “conformity via information sharing” and 
“conformity due to copycat” (Manski, 1993). Clearly, ours is the former. For other issues 
related to empirical social interaction, refer to Moffitt (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2000). 
49 One can think of this as the income effect of a price change. There is no substitution effect 
because prices are gender-neutral. 
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entrants”, fee changes may still alter the equilibrium discrimination index, contingent 
on the initial state. 
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Therefore, we can conclude that (i) if there was initially a pro-boy bias, a fee cut will 
reduce that bias; (ii) if there was a pro-girl bias, a fee hike will reduce that bias; and 
(iii) if there were no biases, fee changes do not affect the status quo.  
 
Regrettably, since primary and secondary school fees are heavily subsidised for the 
hill tribes, we do not have a sizeable measure of the marginal cost of schooling. 
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Besides, as our data is cross sectional, it cannot reflect changes in fees. Therefore, the 
results in equation (27) are not empirically testable from our data, but remain a 
prospect for future research. 
 
6.3 Gender Specific Tasks 
Previously, we assumed that girls are normally responsible for household work while 
boys are not. True enough, our data reveals that there are eight times as many girls 
who do household work as there are boys50. With such glaring statistics, one wonders 
if pro-boy biases can be reduced if household work were to be more evenly 
distributed.  
 
Looking to our model, the apparent answer is yes, because the relative opportunity 
costs of time spent in schooling will become much higher for boys, when household 
chores are passed (from girls) to them51. As such, other things being equal, we expect 
the eradication of social norms such as “women as homemakers” to dilute existing 
discriminatory behaviour.  
 
Again, to prove this hypothesis will require a set of data that is different from ours, as 
it must contain considerable statistical variation in the gender distribution of 






                                                 
50 This statistic excludes those households with toddlers who are too young to perform 
household work. In addition, even though a very small number of sons actually perform such 
tasks, they clock, on average, three times less hours (per day) than daughters.  
51 The corollary is also true for boys passing on farm work to girls. 
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7  Conclusions 
Gender discrimination in schooling is practised for several reasons. Among them, we 
claim, are incentives due to economic differentials by gender. In this thesis, we argue 
that when parents make rational schooling decisions for their children, the interplay 
of differentials in (i) the marginal loss of time due to schooling, (ii) the marginal 
return on future wage income, and (iii) the transfer rate of old-age support will 
sufficiently determine the level of discrimination. Estimates from the linear 
probability model, probit and logit specifications all proved to be consistent with our 
proposition. 
 
Having said that, we are not suggesting that economic differentials are necessary 
conditions for gender discrimination, only that they may be sufficient. As such, the 
results of this thesis are in no way contradictory to the existing literature, but rather, 
serve as an important reminder that economics plays a vital role in explaining 
discriminatory behaviour. 
 
Two other results evolve from this study. First, given that schooling is essentially free, 
income and wealth appear to have little discernible impact on gender discrimination. 
If financial constraints are non-binding, poorer parents are no more likely to 
discriminate than richer ones, and the empirical results confirm our theoretical 
prediction. Second, in closely-knit social groups, community preferences seem to 
affect household decisions via information sharing and conformity. We show that 
households do not copycat because sociable households, more so than less sociable 
ones, tend to conform to community preferences. Again, results from the data suggest 
that we are correct. 
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Limited by the scope of our data, a couple of results cannot be investigated further. 
One of them is the effect of changes in school fees on discriminatory behaviour; the 
other is how gender specific duties determine the state of discrimination. We hope 
that parallel studies with better data will be able to shed more light on these results.  
 
Overall, our results underline the potential role of economic policy in closing the 
gender gap in schooling through eliminating economic differentials across sons and 
daughters. In a hill tribe context, policy makers should understand that tribal parents 
respond to economic incentives despite subscribing to androcentric societal values, 
and are influenced by community preferences, but not financial well being if 
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Age Age of the respondent (either father or mother).
Parent's ID Index Number of Thai identity cards owned by the parents. Rangesbetween 0 to 2.
Total Children Number of children living under the same roof.
Male Headed Dummy variable. One if household is male-headed; zero iffemale-headed.
Father's Education Educational attainment, following the code in Table 1c.
Mother's Education Educational attainment, following the code in Table 1c.
Asset Wealth Data
Mean Wealth Average asset wealth of all candidate households. Found tobe approximately 28,060 Baht.
Household Heterogeneity Data
Amenities Index
Number of items owned - television set, mobile phone,
private toilet, radio, newspapers, pipe or bottled water.
Ranges between 0 to 6.
Project Participation Dummy variable. One if the household has participated inan NGO or governmental project; zero otherwise.
Migration
Dummy variable. One if the respondent believes that, with
more education, her children have a better chance to migrate
to urban cities; zero otherwise.
Own Land Dummy variable. One if the household owns the land theylive on; zero otherwise.
Savings Dummy variable. One if the household have any form ofsavings; zero otherwise.
Sociability Index
Weighted index of the frequency of interaction within the
village, with other villages of the same tribe, and with other
villages of a different tribe. Weights are 1/3, 2/3 and 3/3
respectively. Ranges between 0 to 54.
Educational Attainment
Average educational attainment for all children in the
household. Default educational attainment is 3.5 if no child
is between 7 to 22 years old.
Education Expenditure
Average expenditure per semester for all children in the
household. Expenditures in tuition fees, school uniforms,
textbooks, stationeries, meals, transport and lodgings are
accounted for. There are two semesters every school year.





Ratio of wage slopes of boys to girls. Slope obtained from the
line of best fit, plotting expected urban monthly wage
against educational attainment.
Income Transfer Rate Ratio
Ratio of income transfer rate of boys to girls. Transfer rate
obtained from the parent's expected income transfer portion
of their child's expected urban monthly wage, analysed at
the average educational attainment for all children in the
household. Default educational attainment is 3.5 if no child
is between 7 to 22 years old. Interpolations and
extrapolations are performed when necessary.
Coefficient of Loss Ratio
Ratio of coefficient of loss in income of boys to girls. Strictly
speaking, we are comparing the coefficient of marginal loss
in income due to schooling. This loss in income is due to the
child not performing primary, secondary and household
work. Wage from alternative employment proxies for the
total income loss (per week).
Village Demographic Data
Total Households Number of households in the village.
Total Population Number of people in the village.
Christianity Dummy variable. One if Christianity is the main religion;zero otherwise.
Land Area Land area in "rai", where 1 rai = 1600 m² = 0.0016 km² .





Number of power proxies - whether women can inherit land,
decide who to marry, make schooling decisions for their
children, leave land as bequest, become the village leader.
Ranges between 0 to 5.
Democracy Index
Index of democracy proxies, defined as [leader election
dummy + (village meeting dummy * frequency *
attendance)/1000 + majority vote for public land dummy].
Ranges between 0 to infinity.
Paved Roads Dummy variable. One if paved roads link the village tocities; zero otherwise.
Amenities Index
Number of village amenities - local market store, public
phone, medical facility, mobile market, public toilet,
pharmacy. Ranges between 0 to 6.
Inflation Index
Index of price changes in rice, defined as [(price difference
per unit between now and a year ago)/price per unit a year
ago].
Waste Drainage Dummy variable. One if waste is disposed by drainage; zerootherwise.
Defecation Facilities Dummy variable. One if sewage facilities are commonlyused for defecation; zero otherwise.
Hygiene Index
Index of hygienic facilities - drainage for waste, sewage for
defecation, source of drinking water during wet and dry
season + clean source of water for bathing. For source of
drinking water, pipe or bottled drinking water are weighted
at two, mountain or well water are weighted at one, river or
pond water are weighted zero. Ranges between 0 to 8.
Natural Disaster Dummy variable. One if the village was hit by any naturaldisaster in the past one year; zero otherwise.
Schooling Facility Data
Village Schools Number of schools within the village compound.
Village Teachers Number of teachers at schools within the village compound.
Travel Time to School Travel time to the nearest school for boys and girls. One-wayjourney in hours.
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Appendix 3: Tables
Table 1 - Expected Educational Attainment
Age of Child Expected Educational Attainment Code
Less than 7 Nursery or no education 1
Between 7 to 10 Lower primary 2
Between 11 to 12 Upper primary 3
Between 13 to 15 Secondary 4
Between 16 to 18 High school 5
19 and above Tertiary 6
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Table 2 - Demographic Breakdown by Discrimination
Proportions of Total Candidate Households in Parentheses









Karen A 17 (0.531) 10 (0.313) 05 (0.156) 32 1.08
B 26 (0.667) 06 (0.154) 07 (0.179) 39 1.10
Karen (Total) 43 (0.606) 16 (0.225) 12 (0.169) 71 1.09
Hmong A 10 (0.345) 17 (0.586) 02 (0.069) 29 1.06
Lahu A 06 (0.667) 03 (0.333) 0 09 1.16
B 08 (0.533) 04 (0.267) 03 (0.200) 15 1.09
Lahu (Total) 14 (0.583) 07 (0.292) 03 (0.125) 24 1.12
Yao A 10 (0.455) 09 (0.409) 03 (0.136) 22 1.11
Akha A 05 (0.263) 08 (0.421) 06 (0.316) 19 0.98
B 24 (0.667) 12 (0.333) 0 36 1.17
Akha (Total) 29 (0.527) 20 (0.364) 06 (0.109) 55 1.10
Lisu A 11 (0.611) 06 (0.333) 01 (0.056) 18 1.14
B 14 0.737) 04 (0.211) 01 (0.053) 19 1.16
C 12 (0.667) 06 (0.333) 0 18 1.13
Lisu (Total) 37 (0.673) 16 (0.291) 02 (0.036) 55 1.14
Grand Total 143 85 28 256 1.11
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Table 3 - Household Heterogeneity






Pro-Boy Less        
Pro-Girl P-Value
Household Demographic Data
Age 47.39 (11.46) 42.19 (10.40) 44.25 (10.54)  3.14 (2.37) 0.187
Parent's ID Index 1.20 (0.96) 1.21 (0.94) 1.21 (0.99)  0.01 (0.20) 0.960
Total Children 3.41 (1.28) 3.39 (1.25) 3.25 (1.24)  0.16 (0.27) 0.554
Male Headed* 0.91 0.94 0.96 -0.06
Father's Education 0.78 (1.32) 1.21 (1.55) 1.39 (1.77) -0.61 (0.29) 0.037
Mother's Education 0.59 (1.32) 0.66 (1.34) 0.39 (1.17)  0.20 (0.27) 0.460
Asset Wealth Data
Less than Mean Wealth* 0.90 0.78 0.86  0.04
Household Heterogeneity Data
Amenities Index 3.52 (1.33) 3.39 (1.54) 3.54 (1.64) -0.02 (0.29) 0.945
Project Participation* 0.94 0.94 1.00 -0.06
Migration* 0.92 0.89 0.96 -0.04
Own Land* 0.77 0.80 1.00 -0.23
Savings* 0.69 0.69 0.75 -0.06
Sociability Index 5.60 (1.98) 5.20 (2.03) 5.18 (2.16)  0.42 (0.42) 0.319
Gender Differential Data
Wage Returns Ratio 1.36 (0.56) 1.11 (0.27) 0.90 (0.14)  0.46 (0.11) 0.000
Income Transfer Rate Ratio 1.09 (0.14) 0.99 (0.09) 0.91 (0.11)  0.18 (0.03) 0.000
Coefficient of Loss Ratio 2.32 (1.84) 1.04 (0.14) 0.68 (0.26)  1.64 (0.35) 0.000
All figures are averages, except for those corresponding to * binary variables, which refer to the proportion of "ones". P-values are for two-tailed t-tests; 
the null hypothesis is that the difference between pro-boy and pro-girl is zero.
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Table 4 - Village Heterogeneity






Pro-Boy Less      
Pro-Girl P-Value
Village Demographic Data
Total Households 145 (121) 144 (122) 169 (140) -24 (26) 0.357
Total Population 648 (358) 709 (449) 650 (406) -2 (77) 0.979
Christianity* 0.03 0.09 0.21 -0.18
Land Area 6.51 (6.72) 5.33 (4.80) 7.83 (7.36) -1.32 (1.43) 0.357
Village Heterogeneity Data
Women Power Index 4.08 (1.22) 3.47 (1.80) 3.86 (1.15)  0.22 (0.25) 0.380
Democracy Index 1.82 (1.07) 1.69 (0.98) 2.01 (1.04) -0.19 (0.22) 0.389
Paved Roads* 0.62 0.61 0.64 -0.02
Amenities Index 3.02 (0.86) 2.89 (0.79) 3.14 (0.89) -0.12 (0.18) 0.506
Inflation Index 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) -0.02 (0.01) 0.047
Waste Drainage* 0.25 0.21 0.00  0.25
Defecation Facilities* 0.83 0.86 1.00 -0.17
Hygiene Index 4.15 (0.60) 4.02 (0.51) 4.07 (0.66)  0.08 (0.13) 0.539
Natural Disaster* 0.51 0.36 0.43  0.08
Schooling Facility Data
Village Schools 0 (1) 0 (0) 1 (1) -1 (0) 0.000
Village Teachers 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3)  0 (1) 1.000
Travel Time to School 0.48 (0.35) 0.47 (0.38) 0.54 (0.35) -0.06 (0.07) 0.393
All figures are averages, except for those corresponding to * binary variables, which refer to the proportion of "ones". Averages and standard errors for 
village schools and teachers are rounded off to the nearest integer. P-values are for two-tailed t-tests; the null hypothesis is that the difference between 
pro-boy and pro-girl is zero.
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Table 5 - Determinants of Discrimination (Linear Probability Model)
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)
Age  0.004 (0.002)**  0.004 (0.002)**  0.002 (0.002)
Parent's ID Index -0.026 (0.032) -0.002 (0.029) -0.043 (0.031)
Total Children -0.006 (0.019)
Male Headed*  0.010 (0.083)
Father's Education -0.003 (0.016)
Mother's Education  0.010 (0.014)  0.012 (0.012)  0.009 (0.012)
Less than Mean Wealth*  0.097 (0.082)  0.058 (0.065)  0.004 (0.073)
Household Amenities Index  0.014 (0.014)  0.014 (0.013)  0.006 (0.013)
Project Participation*  0.024 (0.091)
Migration*  0.067 (0.056)  0.047 (0.051) -0.010 (0.048)
Own Land* -0.057 (0.087)
Savings* -0.029 (0.040) -0.026 (0.038) -0.052 (0.037)
Sociability Index -0.008 (0.013)
Wage Returns Ratio Dummy*  0.251 (0.046)***  0.244 (0.045)***  0.256 (0.047)***
Income Transfer Rate Ratio Dummy*  0.450 (0.056)***  0.455 (0.057)***  0.449 (0.056)***
Coefficient of Loss Ratio Dummy*  0.374 (0.060)***  0.371 (0.060)***  0.365 (0.060)***
Christianity* -0.280 (0.301) -0.138 (0.084)
Land Area -0.010 (0.010)  0.012 (0.012)
Women Power Index -0.024 (0.036)
Democracy Index  0.169 (0.088)  0.059 (0.033)
Paved Roads* -0.212 (0.323)
Village Amenities Index  0.117 (0.145)  0.082 (0.042)**
Inflation Index -0.704 (1.715)
Hygiene Index -0.122 (0.060) -0.126 (0.033)***
Natural Disaster* -0.064 (0.298)
Village Schools -7.798 (8.795)  0.496 (0.689)
Village Teachers  1.211 (1.359)  0.072 (0.099)
Travel Time to School  0.054 (0.428)
Village Dummies No No Yes
Percent Correctly Predicted 91.39 91.03 91.08
Fitted Observations Within Unit Interval 151 156 157
Adjusted R² 0.723 0.726 0.724
The dependent variable equals one if and only if D*>1; there are 144 such observations out of 256. All *
explanatory variables are binary. Regressions are robustly estimated using White heteroscedasticity
consistent covariance matrices. Waste drainage and defecation facilities are excluded from the regression
because they are highly correlated with hygiene index. Total households and total population are
included in (1) and (2), but the coefficients are not shown because their values are approximately zero.
The omitted village category in (3) is the Yao. Percent correctly predicted is for D*=1. Coefficients in **
and *** are significant at 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 6 - Determinants of Discrimination (Probit and Logit Specification)
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age  0.076 (0.023)***  0.002 (0.011)  0.142 (0.051)***  0.001 (0.027)
Parent's ID Index  0.684 (0.304)** -0.681 (0.255)***  1.214 (0.574)** -1.190 (0.505)**
Mother's Education -0.221 (0.154)  0.058 (0.125) -0.413 (0.275)  0.096 (0.253)
Less than Mean Wealth*  1.823 (0.981) -0.408 (0.725)  3.373 (1.725) -0.865 (1.844)
Household Amenities Index  0.403 (0.198)** -0.042 (0.130)  0.814 (0.419) -0.071 (0.254)
Migration*  0.939 (0.598) -0.906 (0.522)  1.618 (1.099) -1.392 (1.013)
Savings*  0.321 (0.454) -0.614 (0.309)**  0.616 (0.916) -1.156 (0.607)
Wage Returns Ratio Dummy*  5.898 (1.541)***  2.820 (0.588)***  10.931 (3.623)***  4.966 (1.276)***
Income Transfer Rate Ratio Dummy*  7.519 (1.887)***  3.365 (0.501)***  13.920 (4.508)***  6.070 (1.063)***
Coefficient of Loss Ratio Dummy*  3.063 (0.630)***  1.859 (0.345)***  5.508 (1.393)***  3.335 (0.808)***
Christianity* -4.232 (1.057)*** -7.798 (2.275)***
Land Area  0.470 (0.189)**  0.892 (0.430)**
Democracy Index  1.485 (0.525)***  2.697 (1.045)***
Village Amenities Index  1.387 (0.466)***  2.436 (0.968)**
Hygiene Index -4.539 (1.102)*** -8.373 (2.577)***
Village Schools -16.070 (8.515) -30.624 (18.419)
Village Teachers  2.282 (1.162)**  4.315 (2.515)
Village Dummies No Yes No Yes
Percent Correctly Predicted 95.70 92.58 95.31 93.36
Pseudo R² 0.838 0.749 0.828 0.748
The dependent variable equals one if and only if D*>1; there are 144 such observations out of 256. All * explanatory variables are binary. Regressions are
robustly estimated using Huber-White covariance matrices. Waste drainage and defecation facilities are excluded from the regression because they are
highly correlated with hygiene index. Total households and total population are included in (1) and (3), but the coefficients are not shown because their
values are approximately zero. The omitted village category in (2) and (4) is the Yao. Percent correctly predicted is for D*=1. Coefficients in ** and *** are
significant at 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 7 - Community Preferences and Conformity
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2)
Age  0.004 (0.002)**  0.004 (0.002)**
Parent's ID Index -0.001 (0.030) -0.025 (0.031)
Mother's Education  0.011 (0.013)  0.009 (0.012)
Less than Mean Wealth*  0.057 (0.073)  0.091 (0.079)
Amenities Index  0.014 (0.013)  0.014 (0.013)
Migration*  0.048 (0.052)  0.065 (0.052)
Savings* -0.025 (0.038) -0.024 (0.038)
Wage Returns Ratio Dummy*  0.242 (0.046)***  0.245 (0.045)***
Income Transfer Rate Ratio Dummy*  0.455 (0.057)***  0.453 (0.056)***
Coefficient of Loss Ratio Dummy*  0.373 (0.061)***  0.381 (0.058)***
Christianity* -0.134 (0.091)
Land Area  0.010 (0.014)
Democracy Index  0.058 (0.036)
Amenities Index  0.078 (0.045)
Hygiene Index -0.113 (0.082)
Village Schools -0.478 (0.685)
Village Teachers  0.069 (0.098)
Average Discrimination Index  0.048 (0.024)**  0.356 (0.129)***
Average Discrimination Index x Sociability  0.015 (0.007)**  0.041 (0.019)**
Village Dummies No Yes
Percent Correctly Predicted 90.45 91.77
Fitted Observations Within Unit Interval 157 158
Adjusted R² 0.722 0.730
The dependent variable equals one if and only if D*>1; there are 144 such observations out of 256. All *
explanatory variables are binary. Regressions are robustly estimated using White heteroscedasticity
consistent covariance matrices. Waste drainage and defecation facilities are excluded from the regression
because they are highly correlated with hygiene index. Total households and total population are
included, but the coefficients are not shown because their values are approximately zero. The omitted
village category in (2) is the Yao. Percent correctly predicted is for D*=1. Coefficients in ** and *** are
significant at 5% and 1% respectively.
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Appendix 4: Hill Tribes1
 
Hill tribes have a long history of over one hundred years in Thailand. They first 
established their presence by migrating southwards from China to the lands of 
Myanmar (previously Burma), Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. Many of these hill tribes 
are now settled in the northern part of Thailand, particularly in the provinces of 
Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. Since many of them do not own Thai citizenship, they 
are prohibited from land ownership and are not covered under any wage law. 
 
There are six major hill tribes in Thailand, namely the Karen (or Yang), the Hmong (or 
Meo), the Lahu (or Musser), the Yao (or Mien), the Akha (or Ekaw) and the Lisu (or 
Lisaw). In addition, there exist several other smaller hill tribes, including the Palong, 
the Thin, the Khamu and the Mlabri. The sizes of these hill tribes vary greatly, and 
together, they make up roughly 1.6 percent of Thailand’s population, boasting an 
estimated 991,122 people in 1999 (McKaskill and Kampe, 1997; Ritchie and Bai, 1999).   
 
The primary form of livelihood for all hill tribes is farming, with rice, corn, fruits, 
vegetables and (previously) opium2 as the most popular types of cultivation. Their 
secondary form of livelihood, on the other hand, varies from gathering food and 
timber from the jungle to the production and sale of handicraft.  Each hill tribe has a 
specific preference for locating settlements - some on hilltops while others on 
lowlands. All tribes migrate whenever the soil at their location begins to deplete, and 
many of them still practice primitive slash-and-burn farming to this day. 
                                                 
1 Contents here are drawn from our experiences during the study, and various pieces of 
material (in Thai) obtained from the NGO.  
2 The first opium ban on sale and consumption was announced by the King in 1811, but 
genuine efforts to curb the cultivation of opium were only put in one century later. Today, 
very few (if any) opium fields exist in Northern Thailand. 
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Despite many similarities in their way of life, each hill tribe can easily be 
distinguished by culture, language, religion, art and dress.  Traditionally animists, 
they continue to worship ancestors and believe fervently in spirits. Over the years, 
however, a significant minority has been converted to Christianity, owing to the 
influx of missionaries.   
 
The Karen 
There are approximately 353,574 Karen people living in Thailand in 1999 (Ritchie and 
Bai, 1999) and most of them reside in the provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and 
Mae Hong Son. They can be found both on the highlands and well as lowlands, and 
live in bamboo houses raised on stilts, beneath which dwell their domestic animals.   
 
Karen people who live on hilltops practice swidden agriculture, while the lowlanders 
cultivate irrigated paddy fields. Most of them are skilled farmers who practice crop 
rotation, and trained hunters for wild animals.  
 
Karen women are noted for their weaving, which is done on a back-strap loom. Each 
of the many sections of this large ethnic group has its own style of dress. Unmarried 
girls wear loose white blouses while married ones wear bolder colours, usually blue 
or red. Karen men are known for producing musical instruments, animal bells and  
tobacco pipes, among other crafted items. 
 
Karen people are known to be gentle, peaceful and cooperative, with a strong 




There are approximately 126,300 Hmong people living in Thailand in 1999 (Ritchie 
and Bai, 1999) and they reside across several provinces of Northern Thailand. There 
are two main groups of Hmong – Blue and White. Hmong people are highlanders 
who live in houses that sit on the ground, not on stilts as do most other tribes. They 
do, however, construct a cellar for food storage that sits in between the ground and 
the main floor of their houses.  
 
Hmong people depended on opium cultivation for a very long time, and only recently 
began to cultivate other crops. They also produce exquisite handicraft items as their 
secondary livelihood.  
 
Traditionally, Hmong people practice strict division of labour by gender. Hmong 
women make clothing, from cotton or hemp, richly decorated with embroidery and 
jewellery. Blue Hmong women wear pleated skirts with bands of red, blue and white  
embroidery, and black satin jackets with orange and yellow cuffs and lapels. White 
Hmong women wear black baggy trousers with a long blue cummerbund, and black 
jackets with blue cuffs. Hmong men make crossbows, musical instruments and other 
items from wood, bamboo and rattan. They are also well known blacksmiths and 
gunsmiths.  
 
Hmong people are known to be diligent, patient and independent, fond of wearing 
their silver ornaments during ceremonies. They are strict animists who remain 





There are approximately 85,845 Lahu people living in Thailand in 1999 (Ritchie and 
Bai, 1999) and most of them reside in the provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and 
Mae Hong Son. There are 4 main groups of Lahu – Black, Red, Yellow and Cheleh. 
Lahu people prefer high altitudes and live in houses that are built on high stilts, with 
walls of bamboo or wood, and grass roofing. They are used to an open living area, 
with the store room on one side, and the bedrooms on the other. There is also a 
basement for domestic animals to dwell in. 
 
Lahu people practice shifting cultivation and rarely venture into alternative 
livelihoods. As a result, they continue to be primitive farmers and, as such, are 
usually poorer than other major hill tribes.  
 
Lahu women are skilled in weaving cloth, both on back-strap and foot-treadle looms, 
producing delicate patchwork trims and embroidery. Black Lahu women wear black 
cloaks with diagonal cream stripes and sleeves decorated in bold colours of red and 
yellow. Red Lahu women wear black trousers with white edging and vivid sleeves of 
broad red and blue stripes. All other Lahu groups supplement their traditional 
costumes with sarongs and Thai shirts. Lahu men make excellent musical 
instruments, crossbows, and other items in wood, bamboo and rattan.  As the word 
“Lahu” literally means “hunter”, Lahu people are, naturally, skillful hunters. They are 
also famous for their knowledge of herbal medicine, spicy diet and their ability to 
make the finest baskets in Thailand. 
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Lahu people are sociable and peace-loving, despite being physically larger than 
members of the other tribes. Even though they are traditionally animists, who believe 
in one spirit in command of all others, many have been converted to Christianity.  
 
The Yao 
There are approximately 48,367 Yao people living in Thailand in 1999 (Ritchie and 
Bai, 1999) and they are widely scattered across the provinces of Phayao, Nan and 
Chiang Rai. Yao people usually live on lowlands and live in houses that are built of 
wooden planks on a dirt road. Theses houses typically contain a guest platform, made 
of bamboo, in the communal living area.    
 
For a long time, Yao people depended on producing and selling opium, although 
opium addiction is rare among them. More recently, they have switched to alternative 
livelihoods such as cash crop farming and producing handicrafts. 
 
Yao women are well-known for their magnificent cross-stitch embroidery, which 
richly decorates their clothing. Yao women put on a long black jacket with lapels of 
bright scarlet wool, loose trousers in intricate designs, and an embroidered black 
turban.  Yao men make good silversmiths who produce fine silver jewellery.  
 
Yao people are sociable, peaceful, friendly, and are known to be the “businessmen” 
among the hill tribes. They pride themselves on cleanliness and honour. Owing to 
their medieval Chinese-Taoism roots, Yao is the only tribe with a written language. 
This however, has not stopped many Yao people from converting to Christianity and 




There are approximately 56,616 Akha people living in Thailand in 1999 (Ritchie and 
Bai, 1999). Originating in Tibet, most of them live in the provinces of Chiang Mai and 
Chiang Rai. Akha people prefer the highlands and live in raised houses built on low 
stilts, with a large porch leading to a square living area. Akha villages are easily 
distinguished by carved wooden gates, believed to be occupied by guardian spirits. 
  
Akha people practice conventional slash-and-burn agriculture, and supplement their 
income by producing and selling handicrafts. They are usually among the poorest of 
all hill tribes. Notably, Akha women work very hard in the fields, even to their old 
age, while Akha men lead relatively comfortable lives. 
 
Akha women weave cotton threads into cloth, on a foot-treadle, then dye it with 
indigo, before sewing it into clothing. Akha women wear broad leggings, a short 
black skirt with a white beaded sporran, a loose fitting black jacket with heavily 
embroidered cuffs and lapels, and a black cap covered with silver coins. Akha people 
produce several decorative items of bamboo and seeds. Akha men also make 
crossbows, musical instruments, baskets, and other items of wood, bamboo and 
rattan. 
  
Akha people are often distinguished by extraordinary costumes (black caps with 
silver coins) and the numerous ceremonies and festivities they celebrate. As animists, 
they are deeply superstitious, and follow prescribed guidelines on the practice of their 
religion. Due to high monetary costs of practicing their religion, some of them have 




There are approximately 33,365 Lisu people living in Thailand in 1999 (Ritchie and 
Bai, 1999). Originating in Eastern Tibet, most of them live in the northern provinces of 
Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son. Lisu people like to settle near mountain 
tops, close to streams and waterfalls. They live in houses that sit on the ground, with 
dirt floors and bamboo walls around a central ridge.  
  
Lisu people have relied on opium cultivation, but now turn to cash crop farming and 
producing handicrafts.  
 
Lisu women make their clothing from gaily-coloured cloth stitched onto outfits 
trimmed with rows of multi-coloured strips. Lisu women wear bright colours, 
consisting of a blue or green knee length tunic, with a wide black belt, and blue or 
green pants. Sleeve shoulders and cuffs are heavily embroidered with narrow, 
horizontal bands of blue, red and yellow. Richer Lisu people will also put on massive 
amounts of hand-crafted silver ornaments for festivities. Lisu men are known to be 
“engineers” among the hill tribes, and make crossbows, musical instruments, animal 
traps and other items of wood, bamboo and rattan.  
 
The word “Lisu” is literally translated into “lovers of peace and freedom”. 
Consequently, Lisu people are known to be adaptable and sociable. Typically the 
best-looking of all hill tribes, however, they like to think of themselves as a cut above 
the rest.  Being animists, Lisu people prevalently worship their ancestors, with few 
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Appendix 6: Questionnaires 
 






















1. Please list your household members (including interviewee), and state 
whether they have Thai ID. 
 
SON (1), DAUGHTER (2), SPOUSE (3), MYSELF (4) 
 









   
   
   
   
   
 
  
2. Who is the head of the household?  
 
MOTHER (1), FATHER (2), GRANDFATHER (3), GRANDMOTHER (4)  
  
3. What is the education attainment of the…  
  
NO EDUCATION (0), NON-FORMAL EDUCATION (1), LOWER PRIMARY (2),  
UPPER PRIMARY (3), SECONDARY (4), 




… mother of the household?  
… father of the household?  
  
Household ID  







4. On average, how much (in Thai baht) has your household spent on 
















Son      
Daughter      
 
 
5. List the age, education (formal or non-formal) attainment, and average 
hours of school per day for the past one year of your children. Also, are they 
attending school now? If not, what is the most important reason why not? 
 
SON (1), DAUGHTER (2) 
 
NO EDUCATION (1), LOWER PRIMARY (2),  
UPPER PRIMARY (3), SECONDARY (4), 
HIGH SCHOOL (5), TERTIARY (6) 
 
YES (1), NO (2) 
 
NOT APPLICABLE (0), TOO EXPENSIVE (1), NO AVAILABLE SCHOOL (2), 
NEAREST SCHOOL IS TOO FAR (3), TRAVELLING IS NOT SAFE (4), 















      
      
      
      
 
 
6. What is the primary form of livelihood for your household?               
 
FARMING (1), HANDICRAFT (2), 
LABOUR (3), OTHERS (4) ________________________   
  
7. Who in the household is involved in the primary form of livelihood (including 
interviewee)? How many days a week and hours a day does he/she work? 
 
SON (1), DAUGHTER (2), SPOUSE (3), MYSELF (4) 
 
 







   
   
   




8. What is the secondary form of livelihood for your household? 
 
NIL (0), FARMING (1), HANDICRAFT (2), 
LABOUR (3), OTHERS (4) ________________________ 
 
9. Who in the household is involved in the secondary form of livelihood (including 
interviewee)? How many days a week and hours a day does he/she work? 
 
SON (1), DAUGHTER (2), SPOUSE (3), MYSELF (4) 
 
 







   
   
   
   
 
10. Who in the household is involved in household chores (including interviewee), 
and hours a day is he/she involved? What specific tasks do he/she perform? 
 
SON (1), DAUGHTER (2), SPOUSE (3), MYSELF (4) 
 













Cooking Baby Sitting 
      
      
      
      
 
11. Do you…   
 




… own a television set?  … own a radio receiver?  
… own a mobile telephone?  … read newspapers regularly?  
… own the land you live on?  … own any other land eg. 
farmland? 
 
… have private sanitation 
facilities eg. a private toilet? 
 … have access to pipe or buy 
bottled water? 
 
… participate in any programs 
under government agencies? 
 
 
… participate in any programs 
under NGOs? 
 
… have any form of savings?  … think that your children will 
have a better chance to migrate 
to urban cities with more 
education? 
 




12. Do you interact/communicate regularly with your community 
within the village, residents in other villages of the same tribe, and 
residents in other villages of different tribe, other than for trade 
purpose? If yes, how often? 
 
  
YES (1), NO (2)  
 
LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH (1), ONCE A MONTH (2), 
TWICE A MONTH (3), ONCE A WEEK (4), 
TWICE A WEEK (5), ONCE IN TWO DAYS (6), 
ONCE A DAY (7), TWICE A DAY (8), 
AT LEAST 3 TIMES A DAY (9) 
 
 
Same Tribe   
Same Village Other Village 
Other Tribes 
 
Yes/No?     
How 
often? 
    
 
13. Please list any livestock or farming equipment you own (for the purpose of 
primary or secondary livelihood), and estimate their value in Thai baht. 
 
Livestock Value Equipment Value 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
14. If your children were not involved in your livelihood activities, what alternative 
income-generating activities can they seek now, and how much at the most, can 
they earn a day in Thai baht? 
 
SON (1), DAUGHTER (2) 
 
FARMING (1), HANDICRAFT (2), 





Age Alternative Activity Estimated 
Wages Per Day 
    
    
    
    
    
 
 67
15. For boys and girls with the following education attainment, how much at the 
most do you think they can earn a day (in Thai baht) in the village? How much at 
the most do you think they can earn a day (in Thai baht) in the suburban or urban 
areas? 
 















    
Primary     
Secondary     
High School     
Tertiary     
 
16. For sons and daughters with the following education attainment, how much 
money will you expect them to give you a month when they start work? 
 















    
Primary     
Secondary     
High School     
























English Questionnaire - Village Module 
 





2. How large is the land area of this village in “rai”?  
  
3. How many people live in this village?  
  
4. How many households live in this village?  
  
5. What are the major religions practiced by residents of this village?   
1ST  
2ND  
3RD   
 
SUPERSTITION (1), BUDDHISM (2), 
TAOISM (3, CATHOLICISM (4), 




6. In this community, can women… 
 
YES (1), NO (2) 
 
 
… inherit land?  … leave land as bequest 
when they die? 
 
… decide for themselves who 
to marry? 
 … become the village 
leader? 
 
… decide whether to send 
their children to school? 
   
 
  
7. How is the leader of this community chosen?  
 
ELECTED (1), APPOINTED BY ELDERS (2), 
INHERITED (3), OTHERS (4) 
 
  
8. Are there organised meetings of villager residents to discuss 
community issues and events? If yes, how often are the most 




YES (1), NO (2) 
 
DAY (1), WEEK (2), MONTH (3), 
QUARTER YEAR (4), HALF YEAR (5), YEAR (6) 
 
 
Any Meeting? How Often? How Many People 
Attend? 









9. Who decides how public land is to be used?  
 
VILLAGE LEADER (1), VILLAGE ELDERS (2), 
TRADITION (3), POPULAR VOTE (4), 
HIGHEST BIDDERS (5), OTHERS (6) 
 
  
10. In this village, is there a…   
 
YES (1), NO (2) 
 
 
… local market store?  … mobile market?  
… public telephone?  … public toilet?  
… medical facility eg. clinic?  … a pharmacy?  
  
11. How do people travel to this village? Tick all that apply.  
 
YES (1), NO (2) 
 
 
Foot Motorcycle Car Boat Raft Animals Others 
       
 
   
12. What is the most common type of road surface?   
1ST  
2ND  
3RD   
 
NO ROADS, ONLY WATERWAYS (1), ASPHALT OR CEMENT (2), 
PAVED ROADS WITH STONES OR PEBBLES (3), DIRT ROADS (4), 
OTHERS (5)    
  
13. What is your most basic food for subsistence? What is the price 
(in Thai baht) per unit of the above food now and one year ago? 
 
  
MEAT (1), VEGETABLES (2), 
RICE (3), OTHERS (4)  
 
          
    
Basic Food Price Per Unit Now Price Per Unit Last Year 
 /                 / 
 
  
14. What is the main source of drinking water in this village during 




PIPED WATER (1), PUMP WATER (2), WELL WATER (3), 
 SPRING WATER (4), RAIN WATER (5), RIVER WATER (6), 
LAKE WATER (7), BOTTLED WATTER (8), OTHERS (9) 
 
 
Source of Drinking Water 
Wet Season Dry Season 
Source of Bathing Water 










CONNECTION TO SEWAGE SYSTEM (1), PONDS (2), RIVERS (3), 
DRAINAGE (4), OTHERS (5) 
 
  




PRIVATE TOILETS CONNECTED TO SEWAGE (1), PRIVATE TOILETS 
WITHOUT SEWAGE (2), COMMON TOILETS SHARED WITH 
NEIGHBOURS (3), PUBLIC TOILETS (4), IN THE GARDEN/ FIELD (5) 
IN THE RIVER (6), IN DRAINAGE DITCHES (7), OTHERS (8) 
 
 
17. What is the primary and secondary form of livelihood in this village?           
 
FARMING (1), HANDICRAFT (2), 
LABOUR (3), OTHERS, SPECIFY BELOW (4) 
 




18. Do residents in this community leave temporarily during 
certain times of the year to look for work elsewhere? If yes, where 




YES (1), NO (2)  
 
URBAN AREAS (1), SUBURBAN AREAS (2), RURAL AREAS (3) 
 
FARMING (1), HANDICRAFT (2), 
LABOUR (3), OTHERS, SPECIFY BELOW (4) 
 
 
Work Elsewhere? Where? What Work? 
   
 
 
19. Describe any natural disasters eg. flood, earthquake, famine, drought that took 













20. How many schools are there in the village? Of these, how 
many are primary, secondary or other schools? How many 




 All Schools Primary Secondary Others 
Number     
Teachers     
 
  
21. How many Buddhists schools are there in the province?  
  
22. If students have to travel outside of the village to school, how 
do they get there? How many hours does it take to travel to school 
by that transport type? 
 
 




































































1. กรุณาบอกรายละเอียดเกี่ยวกบัสมาชิกในครอบครัว (รวมตวัผูถูกสัมภาษณดวย) 
และแจงรายชื่อผูที่มีบัตรประจําตวัประชาชน    
 
ลูกชาย (1), ลูกสาว(2), คูสมรส (3), ผูถูกสัมภาษณ (4) 
 
มี (1), ไมม ี(2) 
 
 
ความสัมพันธตอผูถูกสัมภาษณ อายุ บัตรประชาชน 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
  
2. ใครเปนหัวหนาครอบครัว  
 
แม (1)      พอ (2)      ปู หรือตา (3)         ยา หรือยาย (4)  
  
รหัสครัวเรือน  







3. กรุณาบอกระดบัการศกึษาของสมาชิกในครอบครัว  
  
การศึกษานอกระบบ (กศน.) (1)    ประถมตน (2)   ประถมปลาย (3)    มัธยมตน (4)    

















ลูกชาย      
ลูกสาว      
 
 
5. จงบอกอายุ ระดับการศึกษา  จาํนวนชัว่โมงเรียนใน 1 วนัในชวง 1 ปทีผ่านมาของลกูคุณ  
ถาลูกของคุณไมไดเขาเรียนกรุณาบอกเหตุ  
 
ลูกชาย (1), ลูกสาว (2) 
 
ไมไดเขาเรียน (1)  ชั้นประถมตน (2)  ชั้นประถมปลาย (3)  ชั้นมัธยมตน (4) 
ชั้นมัธยมปลาย (5)  อุดมศกึษา (6) 
 
เรียน (1), ไมไดเรียน (2) 
 
ราคาแพงเกินไป (1)  ไมมีโรงเรียนในบริเวณนัน้ (2)  โรงเรียนตั้งอยูไกลเกินไป (3) 













      
      
      








การเกษตร (1)  งานหัตถกรรม (2)  รับจาง  (3)  อืน่ๆ (โปรดระบุในชองที่กําหนดให) (4) 
 
7. ใครเปนผูหารายไดหลักดังกลาวมาสูครัวเรือน และใชเวลาในการทาํงานประมาณ  
กี่ชั่วโมงภายใน 1 วัน 
 





น 1 สัปดาห 
จํานวนชั่วโมงทีท่าํง
านใน 1 วัน 
   
   
   




การเกษตร (1)  งานหัตถกรรม (2)  รับจาง  (3)    
อื่นๆ (โปรดระบุในชองทีก่ําหนดให) (4) 
 
9. ใครเปนผูหารายไดหลักดังกลาวมาสูครัวเรือน และใชเวลาในการทาํงานประมาณ กี่ชัว่โมงภายใน 1 วัน 
 
ลูกชาย(1), ลูกสาว (2), คูสมรส (3) 
 
ความสัมพันธตอผูถูกสัมภาษณ จํานวนวันที่ทํางานใ
น 1 สัปดาห 
จํานวนชั่วโมงทีท่าํง
านใน 1 วัน 
   
   
   













10. ใครเปนผูดูแลงานบาน และใชเวลาในการทํางานประมาณกี่ชั่วโมงภายใน 1 สัปดาห 
 
ลูกชาย(1), ลูกสาว (2), คูสมรส (3) 
 





งานใน 1 วัน 
ทําความสะอาดบ
าน 
ซักเสื้อผา ทําอาหาร ดูแลลูก 
      
      
      
      
 
11. สมาชิกในครวัเรือนของคุณทําส่ิงตางๆ เหลานี้ หรือไม 
 
 
มี (1), ไมม ี(2)    
ดูโทรทศัน  ฟงวิทยุ  
ใชโทรศัพทมือถอื  อานหนังสือพิมพ  
มีที่อยูอาศัยเปนของตนเอง  มีที่ดินทํากนิเปนของตนเอง  
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มี (1)ไมมี (2)  
 
นอยกวา หนึ่งครั้งภายใน 1 เดอืน (1) หนึ่งครั้งตอเดือน (2) 
สองครั้งตอเดือน (3) หนึ่งครั้งตอสัปดาห (4) สองครั้ง ตอสัปดาห (5)   
หนึ่งครั้ง ในเวลา 2 วัน (6) วนัละ 1 คร้ัง (7)  สองครั้ง ตอวัน (8) 
อยางนอย 3 คร้ังตอ 1 วัน (9) 
 
 




มี/ไมม ี     
บอยแคไหน     
 
13. จงบอกชนดิของสัตวเลี้ยง และ อุปกรณในการประกอบอาชีพของคุณ รวมทั้งประมาณมูลคาส่ิงที่คุณมเีปนจํานวนเงิน  
 
สัตวเลี้ยง อุปกรณในการประกอบอาชีพ มูลคา 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   











14.  ถาลูกของคุณยังไมไดทาํงานหารายไดมาสูครอบครัว 
ในอนาคตลูกของคุณสามารถประกอบอาชพีอะไรภายในหมูบานไดบางเพื่อหารายไดมาสูครอบครัว  และอาชพีนั้นๆ 
สามารถสรางรายไดสูงสุดประมาณกี่บาท ตอวัน 
 
ลูกชาย (1), ลูกสาว (2) 
 
การเกษตร (1)  งานหัตถกรรม (2)  รับจาง  (3)  อืน่ๆ (โปรดระบุในชองที่กําหนดให) (4)  
ความสัมพันธตอผูถู
กสัมภาษณ 
อายุ งานที่สามารถทําได รายไดที่จะไดรับตอวัน 
    
    
    
    
    
 
15.  คุณคิดวาเด็กผูชาย หรือเด็กผูหญิงที่เขารับการศกึษาในระดับการศึกษาดังตอไปนี้ 
สามารถหารายไดจากอาชีพภายในหมูบานไดประมาณกี่บาทใน หนึ่งวนั และ 
สามารถหารายไดจากอาชีพในเขตเมืองไดประมาณกีบ่าทใน หนึ่งวัน  
 













ไมเขาเรียน     
ประถมตน     
ประถมปลาย     
มัธยมตน     
มัธยมปลาย     











16. คุณคาดหวังวาจะไดรับเงินจากลูกชาย หรือลูกสาวของคุณเปนจํานวนกี่บาทตอเดอืน เมื่อพวกเขาเริ่มทาํงาน  
โดยดูจากระดับการศึกษาดังตอไปนี้ 
 












ไมเขาเรียน     
ประถมตน     
ประถมปลาย     
มัธยมตน     
มัธยมปลาย     




















Thai Questionnaire – Village Module 




2. หมูบานของคณุมีพื้นที่ประมาณกี่ไร  
  
3. หมูบานของคณุมีประชากรกี่คน  
  
4. หมูบานของคณุมีกี่ครัวเรือน  
  




เชื่อโชคลาภ นับถอืผี (1)   ศาสนาพทุธ (2)   ลุทธิเตา (3)  คริสตคาทอลกิ (4) 
คริสตโปรเตสแตนท(5)  อิสลาม (6)  อื่นๆ (7) 
 3  
6. ในชุมชนของคณุ ผูหญิงไดรับอนุญาตใหทําส่ิงตอไปนี้หรือไม 
 
ได (1)  ไมได (2) 
 
 
รับมรดกสืบทอดการครองที่ดนิ  ยกที่ดินใหลูก หลานเมื่อเสียชีวิต  
เลือกคูครองที่จะแตงงานดวยตนเอง  รับคัดเลือกเปนหัวหนาหมูบาน  
ตัดสินใจในการสงลูกเขาเรียนหนังสือ    
 
  
7. หัวหนาหมูบานไดมาโดยวิธีการใด  
 
เลือกตั้ง (1)  แตงตั้งโดยผูอาวุโสในหมูบาน (2)  รับมรดก (3)  อื่นๆ (4)  
  
8. มีการจัดการประชุมรายงานเหตุการณตางๆ ภายในหมูบานหรือไม  ถามี 
มีการจัดประชุมบอยแคไหน  และมผีูเขารวมกี่คน 
 
 
มี (1)  ไมมี (2)  
 
วันละครั้ง (1)  สัปดาหละครั้ง (2)  เดือนละครั้ง  (3)  4 คร้ัง ใน 1 ป (4) 
2 คร้ัง ใน 1 ป (5)  ปละครั้ง (6) 
 
 
มีการจัดการประชุมหรือไม จํานวนครั้งของการประชุม จํานวนผูเขารวมการประชุม 





9. ใครเปนผูตัดสินการใชทีด่ินของชุมชน    
 
หัวหนาหมูบาน (1)  ผูอาวุโสในหมูบาน (2)  ตามธรรมเนียม ประเพณ ี(3) 
ประชามติ (4)  การ ประมูล (5)   อื่นๆ (6) 
 
  
10. ในหมูบานของคุณมีส่ิงตอไปนีห้รือไม  
 
มี (1), ไมม ี(2) 
 
 
รานคาภายในชุมชน  ตลาดเคลือ่นที?่  
โทรศัพทสาธารณะ?  หองน้ําสาธารณะ?  
สานพยาบาล  รานขายยา  
  
11. คนภายนอกสามารถเดินทางเขาหมูบานของคุณไดดวยดังตอไปนี้ไดหรือไม  
 
ได (1), ไมได (2) 
 
 
เดินเทา จักรยานยนต รถยนต เรือ ลองแพ สัตวตางๆ อื่นๆ 
       
 






ไมมีถนน มีแตทางน้ํา(1)  ลาดยาง หรือปูนซีเมนต(2)  ถนนเปนหิน หรือกรวด (3) 
ถนนดิน (4)  อื่นๆ………………………………… (5) 
3RD   
  
13. คนในหมูบานรับประทานอะไรเปนอาหารหลัก    
  
เนื้อสัตว (1)  ผัก (2)  ขาว (3)  อืน่ๆ………………………(3)              
    
อาหารหลัก ราคาอาหารชนิดนี้ในปจจบุัน ราคาอาหารชนิดนี้เมื่อปที่แลว 










14. จงบอกแหลงน้ําดื่ม น้ําใช ที่สําคัญของหมูบาน 
 
 
น้ําประปา (1)  เครื่องสูบน้ํา (2)  บอน้ํา (3) น้าํพุ (4) น้ําฝน (5) แมน้ํา (6) 






   
 
  
15. สถานที่กําจดั/ทิ้งน้ําเสียภายในหมูบานคืออะไร  
  
ติดตั้งระบบบาํบัดน้ําเสีย (1)  ทั้งลงหนองน้ํา (2)  ทั้งลงแมน้ํา (3) 
ทิ้งลงทอระบายน้าํ (4)  อื่นๆ……………………………………. (5) 
 
  
16. สถานที่ถายอจุาระ ปสสาวะภายในหมูบานคือทีใ่ด  
  
หองน้ําสวนตวัทีต่ิดทอน้ําทิ้ง (1)  หองน้ําสวนตวัทีไ่มมีทอน้ําทิ้ง (2) 
หองน้ําธรรมดาทีใ่ชรวมกับเพือ่นบาน (3)  หองน้ําสาธารณะ (4) 




17. อาชีพหลัก และอาชีพรองของคนในหมูบานคอือะไร           
 




















มี (1),  ไมม ี(2)  
 
เขตเมือง (1), เขตชานเมือง (2), เขตชนบท (3) 
 
การเพาะปลูก (1)  การผลิตงานหัตถกรรม (2)  รับจาง (3)  อืน่ๆ…………………(4) 
 
 
คนขอมูลเพิ่มเติม สถานที ่ อาชพีรอง 
   
 
 
19. ในหมูบานของคุณเคยประสบปญหาภัยธรรมชาติ เชน น้ําทวม พายุ แผนดินไหว ภาวะแหงแลง หรือไม  








20. ในหมูบานของคุณมีโรงเรียนที่สอนในระดบัชัน้ดังตอไปนี้กี่โรงเรียน  และมีจํานวนครูกี่คน  
  
 โรงเรียนทั้งหมด โรงเรียนประถม โรงเรียนมัธยม อื่นๆ 
จํานวนโรงเ
รียน 
    
จํานวนคร ู     
 
  
21. ในจังหวัดของคุณมีโรงเรียนกี่โรงเรียน  
  
22. ถาเด็กในหมูบานของคุณตองเขาเรียนในโรงเรียนนอกหมูบาน  
เด็กๆจะเดินทางไปโรงเรียนโดยวิธีใด    
 
 




การเดินทาง ระยะเวลาที่ใชเดนิทาง การเดินทาง ระยะเวลาที่ใชเดนิทาง 
    
 
 
 
 
